The latest UK Covid-19 Inquiry report highlights a widening gap between evidence and decision-making during the pandemic. Dr Fiona Larner considers what this means for evaluation and public trust today.
The UK Government’s pandemic response has been under the lens in the UK Covid-19 Inquiry, independently chaired by The Rt Hon the Baroness Heather Hallett DBE. Established by former Prime Minister Boris Johnson in 2022 under the Inquiries Act 2005 for events of major public concern, the Inquiry has published the second of (currently) ten interim reports, focusing on core UK decision-making and political governance during the pandemic.
Module 1 examined the resilience and preparedness of the UK for Covid-19, and combined with the findings from Module 2, ultimately demonstrates the knock-on impacts of a broken pathway between evidence and decision-making. If the direction these two modules are facing is a weathervane of what is to come, the Inquiry looks to substantiate the reported lack of trust in the UK government.
What does evaluative best practice look like?
The definition of the main purposes of evaluation, as described by HMT Magenta Book is ingrained in every evaluation professional’s mind: learning and accountability. And whilst the Magenta Book outlines what good evaluation practices look like for UK government spending, evaluation professionals are also aware of how challenging it can be to operationalise all parts. The Inquiry has examined the process of how the UK government responded to Covid-19; the results of this will sound all too familiar to those at the evidence‒policy interface. Importantly, it has a strong resonance with the process evaluators go through in operationalising evidence from evaluation into decision-making and policy and not only has learning opportunities for the UK government with respect to national emergencies, but also for evaluators facing barriers to the uptake of evidence by policymakers and politicians.
Evidence-informed decision-making
The Module 1 report showed that despite a plethora of evidence and opportunities to update and improve the government’s pandemic strategy, this did not occur, and as such the UK was, avoidably, unprepared for Covid-19. This is in great contrast to the reported widely held view that the UK was well prepared for a pandemic, supported by assurances by the Department of Health and Social Care, which the Module 2 report classes as ‘misleading’.
At the outbreak of Covid-19, the UK was reliant on a 2011 preparedness strategy. Flaws in this strategy included an unadaptable flu-specific scope and that evidence available from other virus outbreaks, such as Ebola, MERS and SARS, had not been used to update it. In addition evidence-informed recommendations regarding appropriate roles for decision making, the value of test and trace protocols, and advice on NHS and social care capacity revealed in Public Health England/Department of Health pandemic model exercises were not incorporated into the Department of Health’s UK pandemic strategy, nor shared with advisory committees. Why? Because how evidence was brought into the policymaking process was intrinsically flawed.
Module 1 described how, within departments, the barriers to getting the right evidence to the right policy decision were due to the limited range of experts that advice was sought from, the understanding experts had of their role in advising government, and the way ministers received this advice. Module 2 builds on this narrative highlighting significant gender diversity issues at decision-making levels, and a lack of inclusivity regarding the way those present in decision-making discussions were heard. Considering the greater negative impact Covid-19 had on women, children, disabled, and Black, Asian and minority ethnic communities, the value of inclusive decision-making practices are starkly clear, and remind evaluation professionals that diverse voices are important, if not essential, when collecting and reporting evidence.
“…insufficient weight was given to the views of different people around the decision-making table.”
Module 2, 11.168
These findings clearly influenced the final part of Recommendation 10 in Module 2:
Decision-making groups in each nation should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups. In the UK government, the Minister for Women and Equalities may be the most appropriate minister in this regard.
Accountability: embedding evidence
Baroness Hallett, on publication of the Module 1 Report, not only included recommendations on improved provision of expert advice, using available evidence in pandemic strategy development and increasing transparency regarding lessons learned through simulation exercises, but also described how and when she would hold those responsible to account. The Covid-19 Inquiry website has a dedicated page to record recommendations from each module, the responses from the institution responsible for implementation, and the monitoring process the Inquiry team will follow.
The timeline for response, and the public nature of holding institutions to account has so far worked, with all four UK governments responding to Module 1 within the six-month period requested. This level of transparency is a great lever of accountability and is a mechanism that evaluation teams could follow to embed the use of evidence and learning into programme development and strategic decision-making.
Many of the themes raised here will surely feature at the UK Evaluation Society’s Conference in May 2026 – Bridging the Gap: Evaluation to Action. The Covid-19 Inquiry shows how important getting the right evidence to the right people at the right time is for positive outcomes for all. As evaluation professionals, we can make a huge difference here by sharing our learning with each other and ultimately embedding good evaluation practices across the whole policy-making process.
Author bio - Dr Fiona Larner
Fiona is the Head of Monitoring and Evaluation at The British Academy, the UK’s National Academy for humanities and social science. Originally an interdisciplinary academic in analytical biomedicine at Imperial College and the University of Oxford, Fiona transitioned to public policy evaluation in 2019.
Fiona’s evaluation focus is currently the publicly funded research and development sector, with expertise in research infrastructure, talent, STEM and SHAPE evidence base development. Her passion is ensuring evaluations actively support public sector decision making. Alongside her role as Vice Chair, Fiona is currently the UK Evaluation Society Conference Chair.
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